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From smart specialisation to
smart specialisation policy
Dominique Foray
Chair of Economics and Management of Innovation, College of Management,
Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to focus on the distinction between smart specialisation and
smart specialisation policy and it studies under what conditions a smart specialisation policy is
necessary.
Design/methodology/approach – A conceptual framework is built based on historical evidence
of successful dynamics of structural changes at regional level qualified as “smart specialisation”.
The identification of market and coordination failures that are likely to impede the occurrence of
spontaneous process of smart specialisation makes a good case for a smart specialisation policy.
Findings – The paper highlights important design principles for the policy process that should help
to minimise potential risks of policy failures and policy capture.
Research limitations/implications – The paper does assess the effect of smart specialisation
on innovation and growth at regional level because it is too early to observe and measure effects.
The paper confines itself to conjectures about the effects of such a policy.
Practical implications – The paper makes recommendations and explains some of the practicalities
about the implementation of the policy at regional level.
Originality/value – The paper is one of the first dealing with the topic of smart specialisation policy.
Keywords Innovation, Regional innovation strategies, Smart specialization
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The notion of smart specialisation was conceived around 2009, in a very specific place,
the Knowledge for Growth Expert Group, composed of growth and innovation
economists and established by Research Commissioner J. Potocˇnik in 2006[1]. The
origin of the idea was strongly connected to discussions within the group about foreign
R&D location in European regions and the ways in which these regions could be more
attractive to global firms’ location strategies (Foray et al., 2009). The simple idea is that
regions – in particular the less advanced and transition regions – need to build
capabilities – not only generic capabilities but also capabilities within specific fields,
technologies, sub-systems in order to build competitive advantages in a few market
niches. The idea is neither to narrow down the development path of a region nor to
produce some sort of technological monoculture. The goal of a smart specialisation
strategy is to generate new options or new specialities in order to diversify the structures
of the regional economy.
The notion of smart specialisation defines, therefore, a virtuous process of
diversification through the local concentration of resources and competences in a
certain number of new domains that represent possible paths for transformation
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of productive structures. Turning now to the notion of smart specialisation strategy,
this involves putting in place a process whereby such a dynamic of new speciality
development can be facilitated thanks to punctual and targeted governmental
intervention in order to support in a preferential way the most promising new activities
in terms of discovery, experimentation, potential spillover and structural changes.
Setting up such a process in every European region has become an important objective
of EU cohesion policy – known as RIS3 (Research and Innovation Smart Specialisation
Strategy).
In the next section I will present the analysis of spontaneous smart specialisation
dynamics, the presentation of historical examples and the formulation of stylised facts
(entrepreneurial discovery, spillovers, entry and agglomeration, structural change and
related variety). In Section 3, I will study in what conditions a smart specialisation
policy is necessary. I will present then (Section 4) a simple graphic case of smart
specialisation policy before concluding with the problems that this policy must overcome.
2. Smart specialisation dynamics
In many cases the development process leading to smart specialisation can occur
in a spontaneous and decentralised way, with great success. It is triggered by an
entrepreneurial vision, the discovery of a new domain and the integration of different
types of knowledge to turn this discovery into reality. It is then stimulated by the
spillovers generated by this discovery, the entry and agglomeration of firms around
the new activity and then the growth of the latter, allowing structural change
(diversification, modernisation, transition). Such a process has two faces:
(1) transforming economic (regional) structures; and
(2) building capabilities in new fields (that most frequently appear at the
intersection between an existing sector and new methods to invent and to
innovate (general purpose technology, innovative design, innovative business
model, etc.)).
The entrepreneurial discovery, integration of dispersed knowledge, tension between
private appropriation logic and spillover logic and provision of new specific public
goods necessary to the growth of the new activity all represent difficulties that are not
easily surmountable, often necessitating the implementation of a public policy.
However, the examples below show that this is not always the case!
2.1 Smart specialisation stories
Morez: the vision of Pierre Hyacinte. This was in 1796 in the region of Morez – a small
town on the border between France and Switzerland. Pierre Hyacinte Caseaux
discovered that from his production of nails he could switch to the production of
glasses (spectacles) using the same techniques and capabilities. Very soon other nail
producers started to manufacture glasses, leading to the creation of many factories
within the next 20 years and the opening of a technical school to train apprentices and,
Morez became a world-class centre for the manufacture of glasses. Indeed, this is
a simple story! However it includes the three main episodes of a smart specialisation
process: entrepreneurial discovery and spillovers (the discovery is the fact that it is
possible to move from nails to glasses on the basis of a similar set of engineering
capabilities and techniques); entry and agglomeration of similar and complementary
businesses (cluster formation); structural changes (in the form of transition from an old
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business to a new one). And this is a smart specialisation without policy, like numerous
other cases in history.
Marinha Grande: Anibal’s travels. In the 1930s, Anibal H. Abrantes created the
first mould manufacturing company in Portugal, the main market for which was
glass-making. But the latter was declining and Abrantes very quickly saw the economic
potential offered by the new plastic products market. He observed the rapid development
of “plastic firms” in a large number of sectors (toys, electrical equipment, household
utensils and articles). He travelled all over Europe and brought back all sorts of plastic
products manufactured by injection moulding for which he wanted to design and produce
the moulds. He then explored the possibility of a major diversification of his companies by
converting the production tooling. This entrepreneurial discovery was to have two effects
(Sopas, 2001): providing an exceptional boost to the mould manufacturing industry in
which the Marinha Grande cluster still plays a very important role today and encouraging
the setting up of a large number of firms producing plastic articles in the same region.
As in Morez, the sequence is infallible and the industrial dynamic very virtuous:
entrepreneurial discovery, entry and agglomeration, structural change!
Lyon: the modern Canuts. As a result of a crisis situation faced by traditional
markets in the silk industry (that began to decline in the 1960s), a dozen firms broke
away from the Lyon factory to explore ways of orchestrating a fundamental transition
from silk to technical fabrics (Houssel and Houssel, 1992). They were silk manufacturers
who had discovered that the Americans were using glass fibre in the aeronautics sector
and these firms worked on the integration of these new materials (glass fibre and then
composite materials) into their processes. “This marriage between textile and chemistry
opens the way to a multitude of products for new outlets in aerospace and transport
equipment, sports, protection and decoration items, medical prostheses and geotextiles”
(Houssel and Houssel, 1992). In the big Lyon chemical complex firms found the
specialists they needed to resolve complex knowledge integration problems relating to
the spinning of glass fibre, resolve warping problems and master the adhesion of
the resin to the glass fibre. The nose of the Concorde supersonic airliner, the tailfin of the
Airbus 330 and the sails of some of the boats participating in the America’s Cup are
products symbolising this successful transition. Here again entrepreneurial discovery,
agglomeration and structural changes characterise this dynamic that leads to the
construction of very strong competitive advantages, realised by the creation of over 2,000
jobs between the early 1970s and end of the 1980s.
Finland: pulp and paper companies. In Finland, a group of companies in the pulp
and paper industry were exploring the potentials of some new applied science and
technologies to improve the operational efficiency of manufacturing processes in
this traditional industry (Nikulainen, 2008). A few Finnish entrepreneurs viewed
nanotechnology as a promising source of valuable applications and firms in this
industry were taking step to assess this potentiality. Some firms responded to these
opportunities by increasing their R&D spending to explore recent advances in
nanotechnology in order to develop applications for their own sector. The emergence of
a new R&D collaboration network – involving incumbents, research institutions,
specialised suppliers and universities – was a critical step for the assessment of the
usefulness and value of developing nanotechnology applications for pulp and paper
processes. Once again we see an entrepreneurial discovery process at work that
assembles different actors and will lead to the development of a new activity – at the
cross-roads between a new technology and a traditional sector – and structural
changes (modernisation and diversification).
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Simple dynamics and stylised facts. Cases like Morez, Marinha Grande, Lyon and the
Finnish pulp and paper industry of successful transformation processes, many of
which have one or more elements of a smart specialisation process, are numerous and
have been extensively studied in the literature both in the economics of geography of
innovation and regional policy and in historical studies of technological change
(although not under the heading of smart specialisation).
I made these stories very simple to illuminate some stylised facts. They were of
course more complicated and the production decisions of Mr Caseaux in Morez and
others in Marinha Grande, Lyon or Finland were far less obvious than I have described
and these smart specialisation successes were therefore low probability events and
hard to predict. The four stories are also very different in their sectoral and geographic
contexts, as well as their historical circumstances. But there are noticeable similarities
that in a way represent the common structure of a smart specialisation dynamic.
2.2 Entrepreneurial discovery
The fundamental act underlying the described historical dynamics is an
entrepreneurial discovery. It precedes the innovation stage and consists of the
exploration and opening up of a new domain of opportunities (technological and
market), potentially rich in numerous innovations that will subsequently occur.
It is clear that the entrepreneurial discovery, which lies at the origin of each of the
historical dynamics presented, does not only amount to innovation – although it
increases its probability – it does not just amount to a basic research phase either as
it is essentially oriented towards the market and applications. It is the demonstration
that something is possible – for example moving from the manufacture of nails to
glasses; developing from traditional silk manufacture to a production of technical
fabrics; integrating nanotechnologies into the wood pulp production process; shifting
from one potentially declining market to a new growing one. Entrepreneurial discovery
is the essential phase, the decisive link that allows the system to reorient and renew
itself. Indeed, the entrepreneurial discovery that drives the process of smart
specialisation is not simply the advent of an innovation but the deployment and
variation of innovative ideas in a specialised area that generate knowledge about the
future economic value of a possible direction of change.
As far as I am aware, the earliest economic conceptualisation of “discovery” as
opposed to innovation is to be found in the works that Hirshleifer (1971) devoted to
knowledge and information. In his works he developed a formal expression of
discovery information as a compound event A which consists of the joint happenings:
“state a is true (something is possible)” and “this fact is successfully exploited (what is
possible is created)”. The first event has a probability Pa while the second event has a
probabilityPAwithPa4PA. The discovery process provides information aboutPa:
something is possible that will happen with a probability PA.
The discovery A may be about the potential of a general purpose technology
application to transform processes in a traditional sector (case of pulp and paper). Or it
may be about the possibility of a diversification path based on the exploitation of
potential economies of scope and internal spillovers (case of moulding firms that diversify
their products from the glass-making industry to new markets, as in the Marinha Grande
case). Or the discovery is about the possibility of a transition path from a low-productivity
area to a higher one (from traditional silk to technical materials in Lyon)[2].
All these cases do indeed describe entrepreneurial explorations, experiments and
discoveries (not simple innovations) which are about: first, the complementarity
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between a general purpose technology (or a key enabling technology) application and a
traditional sector[3]; or second, potential economies of scope between two different
lines of business that can stimulate a diversification process; or third, a transition path
from an existing set of collective capabilities to the foundations of a new business.
An entrepreneurial discovery is a new area of structural change that opens up, into
which a whole segment of an industry can move to explore it and generate numerous
innovations.
Entrepreneurial knowledge and economic knowledge. The various stories presented
above place the notion of entrepreneurial knowledge at the centre of the process.
Entrepreneurial knowledge – composed of vision and integration between different
bodies of knowledge – plays an essential role in the discovery of a new domain; it is
the driver of the discovery process. Entrepreneurial knowledge involves much more
than knowledge about science and techniques. Rather, it combines and relates such
knowledge about science, technology and engineering with knowledge of market
growth potential, potential competitors as well as the whole set of inputs and services
required for launching a new activity. From the policy point of view that will be
introduced later in this paper, entrepreneurial knowledge is thus a precious input to
generate relevant information during the priority-setting process.
It would be a mistake to think that the entrepreneurial discovery process generates
only technological knowledge – what works from a technological point of view. No!
The discovery focuses especially on economic knowledge – the knowledge of what
works (and does not work) economically, as elaborated by Hayek and which is central
to the general theory of economic dynamism developed by Phelps (2013). The
entrepreneurial discovery process is basically economic experimentation with new
ideas, which, of course, will to a great extent emanate from scientific and technological
inventions.
Figure 1 presents and links both types of knowledge within the entrepreneurial
discovery framework: the one (entrepreneurial knowledge) that must be mobilised and
integrated as an input of the discovery process and the one (economic knowledge) that
represents the output of this discovery process.
Entrepreneurial
Knowledge
Science and Technology
Visions
Markets
Entrepreneurial
Discovery
Process
Economic
Knowledge
What works
economically
Innovation and
Early Growth of
the New Activity
Smart
SpecialisationFigure 1.
Entrepreneurial
knowledge and smart
specialisation
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The locus of entrepreneurial discovery. The processes of entrepreneurial discovery
and exploration of new domains of potential innovations usually require the
integration of divided and dispersed knowledge (see Appendix). This is why
the organisational forms most appropriate for entrepreneurial discovery are the
network, association or partnership, forms allowing the integration of knowledge
originating from firms, research laboratories, specialised suppliers and clients.
We also observe the presence of more horizontal associations, allowing for example
the collaboration of small firms that share certain infrastructures and services for
collective exploration of a new domain.
However the large integrated company is also a possible locus since it is by
definition capable of assembling very diversified knowledge and carrying out risky
discovery projects by financing its projects with its own resources. In her recent work,
S. Berger (2013) gives numerous examples of German companies that create new
industries through an internal entrepreneurial discovery process: “What (we) saw in
company after company was the repurposing of key technologies to develop wholly
new products and services [y]. New businesses are being created, not usually through
start-ups – in contrast to the American model – but through the transformation of
old capabilities and their reapplication and repurposing for new ends” (Berger, 2013,
pp. 134-137). Berger’s book is brimming with examples of companies, moving from
autos to solar modules, from semiconductors to solar cells or from machines to make
spark plugs to machines that make medical devices like artificial knees (Berger, 2013,
p. 137). These are very illuminating cases of entrepreneurial knowledge structuring
(often thanks to relations between the large company and one of its clients that poses a
very specific industrial problem), exploration of the new domain (e.g. the application of
core wet chemistry technologies to solar cell equipment) and economic knowledge
production (via the implementation of new equipment at the client company) (Berger,
2013, p. 134). The organisational characteristics of the large integrated company enable
all this to be accomplished.
Therefore, numerous organisational forms are possible for integrating divided and
dispersed knowledge and managing the risks of entrepreneurial discovery projects,
from the research laboratory-backed start-up to the large integrated firm, and all sorts
of forms of networks in between.
2.3 Spillovers and entry of similar or complementary businesses
Discoveries are characterised by a strong learning dimension. The social value of the
discovery is that it informs the whole system that a particular domain of R&D and
innovation is likely to create new opportunities for the regional economy. This is not
the standard model, whereby an innovator excludes others from the use of the
innovation in order to appropriate the largest fraction of the benefits. Discoveries and
subsequent emerging activities have the potential to provide learning spillovers to
other agents in the regional economy. Thus, as Rodrik (2004) argues, the reward for
entrepreneurial discoveries (if it is needed, i.e. in case of informational externality
problems) has to be structured in such a way that it will maximise these spillovers.
While entrepreneurial discovery signifies the opening up of exploitation
opportunities, entry constitutes the confirmation that others see this discovery as
meaningful. When the initial experiment and discovery are successful and diffused,
other agents are induced to shift investments away from older domains with less
growth potential to the new one. According to Hirshleifer (1971), public information
about the discovery (aboutPa) is socially valuable in redirecting productive decisions.
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Entry is a key ingredient of smart specialisation so that agglomeration externalities
can be realised: the discovery of a potential domain in which a region could become a
leader should very quickly result in multiple entrants to the new activity. This is the
onset of the clustering phase of a smart specialisation process; i.e. the formation of
regional concentration of co-located activities and resources in related fields.
2.4 Structural changes and related variety
The potential success of discoveries and new activities that aim at exploring and
opening up a new area of opportunities will ultimately translate into some kind of
structural changes within the economy. The outcome of the process is thus much more
than a “simple” technological innovation, but rather a structural evolution of the whole
regional economy. Different logics of structural transformations can be identified:
. Transition is characterised by a new domain emerging from an existing
industrial commons (a collection of R&D, engineering and manufacturing
capabilities that sustain innovation). The case of silk/textile firms in Lyon
exemplifies such a transition pattern from traditional technologies for old
declining markets to new technologies allowing these firms to enter new markets.
. Modernisation is manifest when the development of specific applications of a
general purpose technology produces a significant impact on the efficiency and
quality of an existing (often traditional) sector. A good case in point is the
example mentioned above of the development of nanotechnology applications to
improve processes and products in the pulp and paper industry. There are many
other examples, such as the development of ICT applications in tourism and the
exploration of biotech potentials in the agrofood industry. In all these instances,
the intersection between the development of applications of a general purpose
technology and a mature sector defines a space of opportunities in which
entrepreneurs’ experiments and discoveries can be expected to produce socially
useful knowledge.
. Diversification, in a narrow sense, is a third pattern. In such cases the discovery
concerns potential synergies (economies of scope) that are likely to materialise
between an existing activity and a new one. Such synergies make the move
towards a new growing market attractive and profitable.
. Radical foundation is a fourth pattern. In this case, a new domain is founded
with no direct link with existing structures.
It is important to have some sort of typology of structural changes in mind because it
will provide policy makers with the possibility to think ahead – looking at my regional
economy, where, in or between which sectors are structural changes most desirable ? – and
will produce information in what kind of domains or sectors entrepreneurial discovery
could be socially valuable.
One can see from the cases above that, in general, entrepreneurial discoveries relate
to existing structures and local knowledge. Modernisation, diversification and
transition are forms of evolution whose point of departure is existing productive
capabilities, which are determined by local technological and productive contexts and
stimulated by the integration of new knowledge. All cases described exemplify
processes of transformation that link the existing productive structures to new
domains of potential competitive advantages. All these cases involve the generation of
related variety (Frenken et al., 2007; Neffke et al., 2009; Boschma and Frenken, 2009).
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Related variety is the fundamental logic of translating entrepreneurial discovery
and subsequent new activity into structural change. This means that technological
contexts matter for evolution in terms of pathways for innovation. Most trends
initiated by an entrepreneurial discovery process are related to the existing productive
structure, which they will transform via processes of modernisation, diversification or
transition. As a result, “regions diversify by branching into industries that are related
to their current industries” (Neffke et al., 2009).
However, the fourth pattern is different in this respect. It involves the less frequent
case of the radical foundation of a new domain. This case does not fall into the related
diversification pattern and involves the opening up of exploitation opportunities
unrelated to any existing productive assets.
To summarise this first section, we have seen that history is brimming with
successful smart specialisation processes that occurred spontaneously, without any
policy, thanks to the discovery and coordination capacities of the private agents
themselves. This is an ideal situation that is of course unlikely to happen for many
reasons; hence the necessity for policy and strategies when regional systems are
suffering from collective myopia or inertia or more simply need to start afresh.
3. From smart specialisation process to policy
The notion of entrepreneurial discovery lies at the heart of the smart specialisation
logic. And yet entrepreneurial discoveries may not be produced in sufficient quantity
for reasons of imperfect appropriability, lack of capabilities and difficult credit access.
A discovery, if successful, launches the development of a new speciality aimed at
transforming the system; however, this speciality may remain sub-critical in terms
of scale, network, clusters, complementary investments and specific public goods for
numerous reasons stemming from coordination failures. Resources must then be
concentrated on a small number of new activities, which will therefore be priorities, in
order to reach the critical thresholds and minimum efficiency scale that will allow these
activities to develop.
The processes in Morez, Lyon or Finland might be an exception and the big policy
question is therefore to ask what are the structural conditions and policies in a given
region that will increase the likelihood of such events and that there will be a good
number of experiments and discoveries – some giving rise to real solid drivers for
regional economic growth? While cases of smart specialisation processes without a
policy do exist, in many instances market and coordination failures make policies
indispensable.
4. Graphical representation of a smart specialisation policy in Region X
I can provide a graphical representation of what is at stake with a smart specialisation
policy. Why do I think that smart specialisation can make a difference vis-a`-vis the
older horizontal policies? Let’s take Region X, not very well advanced, and I construct a
measure of knowledge convergence – some kind of composite index including several
indicators concerning higher education, scientific publications, patent intensity, R&D
intensity, venture capital, and so on. For the last decades, the region has devoted most
of its resources to horizontal policies – i.e. policies aimed at improving general
framework conditions and targeting “whole populations” (of firms, people) to upgrade
capabilities. But the results are somewhat discouraging.
There is still a big knowledge gap between this region and the leading ones. This is
by the way what the first evaluation exercises regarding the effect of structural funds
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in RTDI for the period 2000-2009 have shown: no significant contribution of this policy
to economic growth (Landabaso, 2013; Muscio et al., 2013)[4].
Of course these horizontal policies need to be continued through European as well
as national programmes but in addition to these policies, Region X is implementing a
smart specialisation strategy and prioritises two, three or more new activities and
these new activities – because of resource concentration as well as a proper method to
identify and select them – will approach the frontier of knowledge convergence. The
next figure presents some hypothetical examples.
What are the three things that have been prioritised? These are new discovery
activities (R&D and innovation) that complement existing structures and assets. They
are likely to generate informational spillovers on the feasibility and future value of
certain paths of structural change through R&D and innovation in an important sector
(or at the intersection between sectors) of the regional economy. By way of explanation,
the first activity involves the connection between a public laboratory specialised in
animal genetics, a strong and high-quality but traditional breeding sector and some
specialised suppliers of technological solutions. The aim of this first activity is to shift
an important traditional sector into the modern part of the economy by integrating into
the former the appropriate scientific knowledge. The second activity involves a group
of firms belonging to the traditional ceramics sector, which want to explore a new
domain of diversification through the development of advanced ceramics – a
development that will allow these firms to target new market niches. The third activity
emerges from a high-tech cluster and is about the development of advanced photonics
in the area of new renewable energy.
4.1 Vertical policy
It is clear therefore that I am not talking here of horizontal priorities, such as improving
human capital, accelerating transfer of technologies, creating incubators, upgrading
SME capabilities or having good universities, but of vertical priorities regarding some
specific fields, technologies, perhaps companies. A vertical policy is a policy that selects
projects according to preferred fields, sectors or technologies while an horizontal policy
is only responding to demands that arise spontaneously from industry. The change of
logic – from horizontal to vertical – can be justified almost negatively by the incapacity
of recent horizontal policies to shift a large number of regions into the knowledge
economy (Muscio et al., 2013; Percoco, 2013). This does not mean that these policies must
be rejected – we do not know what would happen to these regions without them! It
simply means that for the less advanced and transition regions the usual horizontal
policy was not enough – i.e. had relatively few effects on the knowledge gap as well as on
real economic convergence. Policy makers cannot therefore rely on these policies alone
and a more vertical, targeted and preferential intervention logic – to concentrate
resources on a few new activities originating from a decentralised and well-conducted
entrepreneurial discovery process – must be experimented with.
But the new policy logic involves new implementation. Between Figures 2 and 3,
several things have happened: a structuring process of entrepreneurial knowledge, a
discovery procedure and the constitution of scales or organisation of a critical mass of
resources in a few selected domains.
4.2 Structuring entrepreneurial knowledge
Entrepreneurial knowledge is the critical input in the discovery process (Figure 1).
In some of the cases presented above (Morez, Lyon, pulp and paper in Finland),
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Animal
Genetics for
Breeding
Towards
Advanced
Ceramics
Photonics
for Renewable
Energy Systems
SMEs Training
Finance
Knowledge
Economy
Convergence
Notes: Horizontal lines describe the knowledge gap between various less
developed regions and the top ones in some dimensions of the knowledge
economy (SMEs’ innovation capabilities, access to finance, training investments)
Figure 3.
Vertical (smart
specialisation) policy
in Region X
Knowledge
Economy
Convergence
SMEs Training
Finance
Notes: Horizontal lines describe the knowledge gap between various less
developed regions and the top ones in some dimensions of the knowledge
economy (SMEs’ innovation capabilities, access to finance, training investments)
Figure 2.
Horizontal innovation
policy in Region X
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entrepreneurial knowledge is generated, structured and developed spontaneously, by
the actors themselves, allowing entrepreneurial discovery projects to be accomplished
without the need for any other policy than the one that ensures the consolidation of
framework conditions.
But these cases are perhaps exceptional! Entrepreneurial knowledge is fragmented
and dispersed; it is not available in compact form within one single entity (Bresnahan,
2012). Some elements of this knowledge are also likely to be located elsewhere.
Entrepreneurial knowledge is not necessarily located in high-tech companies, but firms
as well as local universities and public laboratories, medical schools and hospitals,
public services, and communities of practices are possible repositories of elements of
relevant entrepreneurial knowledge.
The scarcity and fragmentation of entrepreneurial knowledge as well as its
uncertain locatability create a strong case for policy intervention in order to support
the generation and/or integration of the knowledge needed for entrepreneurial
discoveries and the development of subsequent new activities. Furthermore, numerous
factors – that can be grouped under the title of market failures – can prevent
a sufficient number of entrepreneurial experiments from being carried out in
certain domains or even in the entire regional economy (see Appendix). Therefore the
main question for policy makers is: who has or where is the entrepreneurial
knowledge and how to integrate the fragmented knowledge base so as to generate
exploration and discovery projects? This is demonstrated by what occurs between
Figures 2 and 3.
It is therefore obvious that a critical policy task involves mobilisation of the
available entrepreneurial knowledge as well as the construction and integration of
the entrepreneurial knowledge that is dispersed and distributed among several entities.
4.3 A problem of identification and discovery
While the identification of actions of a horizontal policy does not give rise to too many
problems (Figure 2), the selection of new activities in a vertical policy logic is far
more difficult: the government does not have innate wisdom. We must guard against
the intellectual logic imposed by the principal-agent model, according to which the
principal (the government) knows from the start which specialities should be
developed and therefore confines itself to setting up the incentives for private industry
to carry out the plan! (Rodrik, 2013). “What if, as I and many others assume, there are
no principals [y] with the robust and panoramic knowledge needed for this directive
role?” (Sabel, 2004, p. 3). In that case, the discovery and collective experimentation
process forms an integral part of political action and must be carried out within the
framework of strategic interactions between the government and the private sector.
The information necessary for prioritisation must, therefore, come from
entrepreneurial discoveries made by firms, laboratories, and specialised services based
on the integration of their knowledge. The discoveries and new activities identified in
Figure 3 have been considered as being potentially rich in spillovers, innovations and
structural changes, thanks to the ex ante evaluation of these projects within the context
of intense and continual interactions between government and industry. This is also
demonstrated by what occurs between Figures 2 and 3.
Then the constitution of scales and the generation of critical masses of resources
will be organised and the policy process will manage the transition from the
entrepreneurial discovery phase to the increasing returns (clustering) phase. Because
of resource concentration, as well as the absorption of knowledge and competences
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from outside, these new activities are likely to soon move towards the frontier in terms
of knowledge convergence (Figure 3).
This is the main idea: having this vertical policy schema in addition to the
horizontal programmes in order to enable a region to diversify by the development and
consolidation of new specialities or new activities that will facilitate the
transformation, revival and renewal of productive structures and generate spillovers
towards the rest of the local economy.
5. The great challenge of policy design
5.1 Avoiding distortions and government failures
The goal of a smart specialisation strategy is therefore to favour the emergence and
development of a few “innovation microsystems” dealing with particular market
niches and mostly related to existing productive structures and assets in order to
transform them through R&D and innovation (structural changes).
But we now need to respond to all of the usual criticisms and questions that
mainstream economics would raise against the case of a non-neutral policy! For
instance, Ann Krueger (2012), commenting on the works of Justin Yfu Lin, a great
promoter of the new structural economics framework, writes: “Although it is certainly
true that not everything can be done at once, focus on selected areas for large
investments to the neglect of the rest of the economy is a highly questionable strategy.
Why it would be preferable to allocate scarce capital so that some activities have
excellent infrastructures while others must manage with seriously deficient structure
is not clear: without further evidence, it would appear to be a distortion”. Ann Krueger
would have plausibly expressed the same objections to smart specialisation policy!
Ann Krueger is part of this large group of economists who accept the need for
industrial policy, but strongly argue that intervention has to be limited to horizontal
and non-neutral interventions and not extended to preferential policies that discriminate
across activities[5].
The difficult policy challenge facing smart specialisation is therefore to emphasise
the vertical logic of prioritisation, while avoiding the government failures usually
associated with the top-down and centralised bureaucratic processes of technology
choices and selection. How to prioritise and favour some R&D and technological
activities, some sub-systems or some fields, while not dissipating the extraordinary
power of market-driven resource allocation in boosting decentralised entrepreneurial
experiments? Vertical prioritisation is difficult; this is why smart specialisation is
about defining a method to help policy makers identify desirable areas for innovation
policy intervention.
These questions are not “simply” academic! They are very topical in policy circles
and business communities, as demonstrated by the number of recent articles published
on this subject in The Economist[6].
5.2 Smart specialisation and the new industrial policy agenda
This kind of question obviously lies at the heart of the agenda of the so-called New
Industrial Policy developed in particular by Rodrik (2004, 2007), Hausmann and Rodrik
(2003), Trajtenberg (2002, 2012) as well as Aghion (2012) and Aghion et al. (2011). One
item on this agenda is reconciling vertical priority-setting (perhaps sectoral policy in
Aghion’s view) and a decentralised innovation economy a` la Baumol or Phelps, i.e.
acknowledging the fact that innovation needs to come from grass roots and not from
the top.
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According to the intellectual logic of this New Industrial Policy school, smart
specialisation can be viewed both as a policy objective to encourage regions and
countries to take risks in selecting a few priorities and a process to help policy makers
identify domains and activities for potential specialisation.
6. Conclusion
This paper focused on the distinction between smart specialisation – as virtuous
dynamic of development of new specialities that can emerge spontaneously in the
economy – and smart specialisation strategy (or policy) – a notion that involves
putting in place a policy process aimed at facilitating this dynamic when it cannot
develop spontaneously. The paper began with the analysis of spontaneous smart
specialisation dynamics, the presentation of historical examples and the formulation of
stylised facts (entrepreneurial discovery, spillovers, entry and agglomeration,
structural change and related variety). Next I studied in what conditions a smart
specialisation policy is necessary. I then presented a simple graphic case of smart
specialisation policy before concluding with the problems that this policy must
overcome (entrepreneurial knowledge structuring, identification and discovery, local
resource concentration and distortions).
The good news is that the “theory” is in progress thanks to the research programme
of some evolutionary and geographical economists (Boschma, Frenken, Neffke and
co-authors) who are building the theory and producing the empirical evidence of
industrial and structural changes (origins, effects, measurement) at regional level. This
will provide a sound framework for developing more detailed, precise and evidence-
based smart specialisation policy prescriptions.
Notes
1. This group was co-chaired by the Commissioner and an academic (B. van Ark and then
D. Foray). The Group included P. Aghion, P.A. David, J.P. Fitoussi, M. da Grac¸a de Carvalho,
B. Hall, M. Kager, G. Licht, J. Mairesse, R. Marimon, S. Metcalfe, M. Mrak, M. O’Sullivan,
A. Sapir, A. Giannitsis and R. Veugelers.
2. These examples are taken from the following case studies, respectively: Nikulainen (2008),
Navarro et al. (2011), Bailey and MacNeil (2009), Houssel and Houssel (1992).
3. I have discussed the centrality of general purpose technology in some patterns of smart
specialisation in Foray, David and Hall (2009).
4. Veugelers and Mrak (2009) analyse the poor performance of the catching up Member States
(i.e. Greece, Portugal, Spain,Ireland, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia,
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic) with respect to their knowledge economy
convergence.
5. Rodrik (2007) proposes an interesting argument about this school of thought: horizontal
interventions are a limiting case more than a clear-cut alternative to sectoral policies. In fact
very few interventions are truly horizontal. They almost necessarily favour some activities,
even if the main goal was not to create such discrimination. This is consistent with Foray
(2009) and Foray et al. (2012) arguing that much of the discourse of economic policy making
has been radically out of step with reality. They support something (neutral R&D policies
that address market failures and do not favour one sector or technology over others) that
does not really exist.
6. See in The Economist: Economic Focus/Tinker, tailor: economists reconsider the merits of
industrial policy, but some flaws are hard to fix, 1 October 2011; industrial design: can
governments help revive innovation and trade?, 3 October 2009; work to be done: how the
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government can help things along, 3 April 2010; picking winners, saving losers: industrial
policy is back in fashion. Have governments learned from past failures? 7 August 2010; and
last but not least Josh Lerner and Dani Rodrik discussion in Industrial policy: statements,
12 July 2010.
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Appendix. Market and coordination failures in a smart specialisation process
The potential presence of strong market and coordination failures as characterising
the economic environment of a smart specialisation process is likely to result both in systemic
under-investment in entrepreneurial discoveries, lower than socially desirable rates of
discoveries, and in obstacles and difficulties of development and early growth of the new
activities, once the discovery has been made.
Entrepreneurial knowledge division and dispersion: the division of knowledge stems from
division of labour and increasing specialisation in the field of knowledge production.
Its dispersion is related to local situations in which knowledge is produced. The result is
an extremely fragmented knowledge base (Foray, 2004, p. 18; Machlup, 1984; Minkler, 1993).
The integration of dispersed and divided knowledge creates an externality that is a source of
market failure (see the weak appropriability case below).
Weak appropriability of entrepreneurial discovery: the discovery of new domains of
opportunities entails significant information externalities that are virtually impossible to
appropriate, thus causing a wide gap between social and private returns to discoveries (Nelson,
1959; Arrow, 1962; Trajtenberg, 2012). Note that the usual solution involving the use of
intellectual property rights is not appropriate here since the information spillovers need to be
maximised (see Hirshleifer argument, above). Thus, the appropriability problem is even more
severe in the case of discovery than in the case of “simple” innovation (for which the use of
a patent is a plausible (although second-best) solution).
Uncertainty: the value of a discovery is more conjectural than that of most types of innovation
and is therefore more likely to be undervalued by firms (the variance of distribution of expected
returns from discoveries is much higher; Arrow, 1962; Dasgupta, 1988).
Access to finance: an additional gap exists between the private rate of return required by an
entrepreneur and the cost of capital when the entrepreneur and financier are different entities
(Hall and Lerner, 2010).
Increasing returns in the form of agglomeration economies (including large firms’ spin-off
externalities, anchor tenant externalities and small firms’ externalities, see Agrawal and
Cockburn, 2003; Agrawal et al., 2010) are a generic source of market failures.
Coordination failures at an early growth stage: a lot of coordination problems may arise from
the early growth stage of the new activity (needs for simultaneous investments in various
segments of the activity) (Rodrik, 2004) as well as the provision of new industry-specific public
goods (Romer, 1993).
I hope that I have made it clear that smart specialisation as a process of evolution is not at all
new. However, a policy aiming at promoting smart specialisation does have some new elements.
I will discuss these new elements now as well as in the next section.
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